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RLUIPA and Method-of-Execution Claims





While the U.S. Constitution contemplates the use of capital
punishment,1 the Constitution has nonetheless served as a bulwark against
the death penalty. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments have constrained the
processes through which a death sentence may be pronounced.2 The Eighth
Amendment has narrowed the class of convicts eligible for execution,
outlawing the execution of the intellectually disabled,3 persons who
committed their crimes as juveniles,4 and those whose crime did not involve
the killing of another. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and
unusual punishments" 6 also outlaws a method-of-execution that will either
cause severe pain or a significant likelihood of it.7 A method-of-execution
* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am thankful
for the support of Prof. Joel Paul, Jonathan Abel, and John R. Mills, whose passion, wit, and
pedagogy has inspired me. Thank you to the editors of the Quarterly for their contributions.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .").
2. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (holding that the Fifth Circuit applied the wrong
standard and that Buck had demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel); Florida v. Hurst, 136
S. Ct. 616 (2016) (finding that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violated the holding in Ring);
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find
the aggravating factors necessary for imposing the death penalty).
3. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
5. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50-51 (2008) (requiring a substantial risk of harm and a
viable alternative for an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d
519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (asking "whether an inmate facing execution has shown that he is subject
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claim is one made by a condemned person alleging that the process of their
execution violates of the Eighth Amendment.
In 2015, in Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme Court established a
requirement for plaintiffs making method-of-execution claims: If they allege
that the method-of-execution used to carry out their death sentence will cause
severe pain, then they must suggest a "known-and-available alternative
method-of-execution" in order for their claim to be heard.8 This requirement
has served as a significant impediment to death row litigants as a narrow
understanding of 'known-and-available' has effectively foreclosed their
ability to comply with this prong of Glossip.9 As a result, the ability to
litigate a method-of-execution claim after Glossip has withered.
A free exercise exception to the known-and-available alternative
requirement is necessary to restore the ability of condemned people to make
method-of-execution claims. Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Department
of Corrections illustrates how Glossip has hampered the ability of
condemned persons to litigate the merits of method-of-execution claims.
There, an Alabama death row inmate brought a claim against his correctional
institute challenging the constitutionality of the state's new lethal injection
protocol.10 The plaintiff complied with Glossip and suggested that instead
of lethal injection, the State should use a firing squad or hanging." However,
because neither of those methods were statutorily permitted in Alabama, the
court rejected Arthur's claim on the grounds that he failed to suggest an
available alternative. 12  The Supreme Court denied Arthur's certiorari
petition. 13 The Eleventh Circuit's holding in effect "shield[s] [the] state from
method-of-execution liability" by allowing the state to statutorily reject
to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Cooey v. Taft, 430 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
8. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2738 (2015).
9. See McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1275 (2017) (where the "possibility that Arkansas could acquire pentobarbital for use in executions
is too speculative to justify stays of execution."); Kelley v. Johnson, 496 S.W.3d 346, 359 (2016),
reh'g denied (July 21, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017), reh'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1838
(2017) ("That the drugs are generally available on the open market says nothing about whether
ADC, as a department of correction, is able to obtain the drugs for the purpose of carrying out an
execution."); In re Ohio Execution Protocol, 860 F.3d 881, 891 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub
nom. Otte v. Morgan, 137 S. Ct. 2238 (2017) (where the state was unable to procure the lethal
injection drug from other state correctional departments pending the grant of a license to import
those drugs from the DEA, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish there was an
available' alternative).
10. Arthur v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied
sub nom. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017), reh'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1838 (2017).
11. Arthur, 840 F.3d at 1319.
12. Id.
13. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017).
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alternative methods. 14 As such, Arthur had no means of seeking relief for
what could possibly be an unconstitutional method-of-execution. If Arthur
were excused from the known-and-available alternative, his claim could be
addressed on the merits and a court could determine whether or not the
method-of-execution at issue there violates the Eighth Amendment. This
Note outlines a manner in which Arthur could have his claim fully addressed.
Death row inmates retain constitutional rights while they await
execution.15 Not only do they have Eighth Amendment rights, but they also
have the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion-a central focus
of the U.S. constitutional project and the nation's founding. 16 When the
government compels a citizen to act in a manner that violates their religious
conscience, those foundational principles are implicated.17 The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") protects
condemned persons, as it does all prisoners, from illegitimate restrictions to
their religious liberty.18 The contention of this Note is that Glossip's
"known-and-available alternative" requirement implicates the religious
consciences of condemned persons and raises constitutional concerns. This
Note will argue that if a condemned person has a religious objection to
capital punishment, the requirement to offer a known-and-available
alternative method-of-execution under Glossip violates their free exercise
rights as interpreted under RLUIPA. The requirement should therefore be
held as unconstitutional as applied to those inmates.
Part I of this Note will provide further background to Glossip and
explain the development of judicial scrutiny with regard to free exercise
claims made by incarcerated persons. Part II will outline free exercise claims
made by incarcerated persons in other contexts. Part II will also address the
substantive requirements of RLUIPA and explain why Glossip's known-
and-available alternative requirement violates the free exercise rights of
condemned persons who have a religious objection to capital punishment.
14. Arthur v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1330 (11th Cir. 2016)
(Wilson, C.J., dissenting).
15. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) (where the court entertained a death
row inmate due process claim).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (". . . no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.").
17. Thomas Jefferson, Reply to Address to the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at
New London, Connecticut (Feb. 4, 1809) in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (S. K. Padover, ed. Duell,
Sloan & Pearce, Inc. 1943) (" No provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to man than that
which protects the rights of conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority.").
18. See, e.g., Hayes v. Bruno, 171 F. Supp. 3d 22, 25 (D. Conn. 2016) (where the court
considered a RLUIPA claim made by a death row inmate); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
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The last part of this Note will consider several counter arguments the plaintiff
envisioned herein may face and suggests another way to conceptualize the
tension between the known-and-available alternative requirement and the
Free Exercise Clause.
I. Glossip and Religious Practice in Prison
A. The Known-and-Available Alternative Requirement
Glossip was litigated by condemned persons who were concerned that
their executions would bear semblance to the grim spectacle that transpired
during Clayton Lockett's botched execution. 19 In Lockett's execution, the
state used 100 mg of midazolam 20 and employed deficient procedureS 21 that
resulted in Lockett writhing on the gurney and telling the assembled
witnesses that the drugs were not "working." 22 Since that execution, Ohio
changed its protocol. Not only did the state increase the dosage of
midazolam to 500 mg, but the state also changed its procedures to ensure
that the person on the gurney is in fact unconscious and that the intravenous
lines were functioning properly.23 In Glossip, the condemned plaintiffs
argued that, in light of Lockett's execution, and faced with the uncertainty
of a new and untested procedure, the risk of a 'cruel and unusual' execution
was constitutionally intolerable.24
The Court rejected the inmates' claim on two grounds. First, the
plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claim; there was insufficient evidence that the use of midazolam as the initial
drug in the execution protocol entailed a substantial risk of severe pain.25
Second, the Court rejected the inmates' claim because they had failed to offer
19. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015).
20. Midazolam is a sedative in the benzodiazepine family of drugs. It is used to induce a
state of unconsciousness in the condemned person before lethal doses of other drugs are injected.
21. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734 ("After the team administered the midazolam and a physician
determined that Lockett was unconscious, the team next administered the paralytic agent
(vecuronium bromide) and most of the potassium chloride. Lockett began to move and speak, at
which point the physician lifted the sheet and determined that the IV had "infiltrated, which means
that the IV fluid, rather than entering Lockett's blood stream, had leaked into the tissue surrounding
the IV access point.") (internal quotations omitted).
22. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2782.
23. Id. at 2735.
24. Id. at 2737.
25. Id. at 2738. See also Hamm v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., No. 18-10636, 2018
WL 1020051, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Hamm v. Dunn, 138 S. Ct.
828 (2018) (where a death row inmate with lymphoma had his method-of-execution claim denied
because he failed to show that the district court erred in finding that the lethal injection procedure
would cause a severe likelihood of pain notwithstanding his deteriorated veins).
788 [Vol. 45:4
FREE EXERCISE EXCEPTION TO GLOSSIP
a known-and-available alternative method-of-execution.26 On this point,
Justice Samuel Alito writing for the majority, stated that a preceding case,
Baze v. Rees,27 addressed the "substantive elements of an Eighth Amendment
method-of-execution claim" and "made [it] clear that the Eighth Amendment
requires a prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative." 28
In Baze, the Court addressed an Eighth Amendment claim challenging
Kentucky's lethal-injection protocol, which, like Ohio's method, also
employed a three-drug cocktail. 29 There was no majority opinion. However,
Justice Alito writing for the majority in Glossip, interpreted Baze as adding
a heightened requirement: In order to protect one's Eighth Amendment
rights in a method-of-execution claim, one must also prove that there is
another method that is "feasible, readily implemented, and in fact
significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain."30
As a consequence of this holding it follows that any condemned person
faces, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it, "a macabre challenge" 31 if they
argue that their execution will violate the Eighth Amendment. Suppose a
state elects to use an objectively cruel method-of-execution-for example,
burning at the stake.32 Under Glossip, the only way for a condemned person
to avoid the pyre would be if they suggested an alternative feasible method-
of-execution, even though the state's proposed method is in clear violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The condemned person therefore faces the choice
of becoming a central participant in planning his or her own execution, by
suggesting how it should occur, or of suffering an agonizing death. The
question this Note addresses is whether this is an affront to the First
Amendment rights of a condemned prisoner who has a religious opposition
to the death penalty.
26. Glossip,135 S. Ct. at 2739.
27. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
28. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739 (emphasis added).
29. Baze, 553 U.S. at 41-44 (explaining that a 'three-drug cocktail' is a term used to describe
an injection protocol where a series of drugs is injected into the executee such that they die).
30. Id. at 52.
31. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017).
32. Although this is perhaps an outlandish thought experiment, the contention that the death
penalty as applied today could be agonizing applies in modern lethal injection procedures. See,
e.g., Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 726 (2017) (citations omitted) ("Execution absent an adequate
sedative thus produces a nightmarish death: The condemned prisoner is conscious but entirely
paralyzed, unable to move or scream his agony, as he suffers 'what may well be the chemical
equivalent of being burned at the stake."').
Summer 2018] 789
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Judicial Scrutiny for Free Exercise Claims Made by Prisoners
Like all prisoners, death row inmates lack the full panoply of rights that
free persons enjoy. However, "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."33
Incarcerated persons retain First Amendment rights circumscribed by their
status as a prisoner and by the legitimate penological objectives of the
prison. 4 In other words, restrictions on speech or religion, for instance, are
legitimate in prison so long as the purpose of those restrictions is to further
a legitimate government interest related to the prison administration. But,
because inmates have the right to due process, 35 "[w]hen a prison regulation
or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts
will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."36 It is, after all, the
role of courts to serve as a check on the excesses of executive authority.
Prison officials are agents of the executive branch. Hence, when prison
officials overstep their authority and infringe upon protected constitutional
rights, courts are empowered to enjoin the prison officials from doing so.
Amongst the most foundational constitutional rights are those
37
surrounding religious practice. However, religious exercise can pose
significant difficulties to prison administration. Prisons are ill-suited to
determine what constitutes religious practice. Further, that prisons may have
to make exemptions and grant privileges based on religious belief conflicts
with the leveling tendencies of the prison environment. 38 With nearly "50%
of inmates attending religious service an average of six times per month" 39
33. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
34. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
35. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
36. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974).
37. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted in 8
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 400 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973) ("The religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man."); Thomas Jefferson, Reply
to Address to the Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church at New London, Connecticut (Feb. 4,
1809) in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (S. K. Padover, ed. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc. 1943) ("No
provision in our Constitution ought to be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of
conscience against the enterprises of the civil authority.").
38. See Noha Moustafa, The Right to Free Exercise of Religion in Prisons: How Courts
Should Determine Sincerity of Religious Belief Under RLUIPA, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 213, 225
(2014) ("Prison facilities are concerned about the cost of providing kosher meals, unfairly
advantaging practitioners of certain religions, fostering feelings of jealousy between inmates, or
overburdening personnel.").
39. Thomas P. O'Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence
on Offender Rehabilitation, in Religion, the Community, and the Rehabilitation of Criminal
Offenders, 35 J. OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 11, 12 (2002). See also Thomas P. O'Connor et
al., Home for Good in Oregon: A Community, Faith and State Reentry Partnership to Increase
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opportunities to restrict religious freedom in prison are replete. Courts are
faced with the problem of judging the veracity of religious conviction, and of
evaluating the justification and importance of a prison regulation. The
separation of powers between branches of government and the lack ofjusticiable
standards have restrained judges from becoming overseers of prisons.
1. Judicial Development of the Standard of Review
Historically, courts were reticent to be the harbinger of religious
exercise within the penitentiary system. In 1952, the Fifth Circuit expressed
the limited role of the judiciary in the prison setting, stating: "it is not the
function of the Courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of
prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who
are illegally confined." 40 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, courts became
more receptive to free exercise claims of inmates largely in response to Black
Muslims and other minority religions whose religious practices were not
already assumed by the penal system. In 1964, the Second Circuit concluded
that "insofar as possible within the limits of prison discipline" prisoners
should be allowed to practice their religion in prison. 41 Then in 1972, the
Court in Cruz v. Beto demonstrated an increasing sensitivity to religious
exercise within prisons, holding that a prison had a duty to provide Muslim
prisoners with a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable
to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional
religious precepts."42 Although several circuits conflicted over what level of
judicial scrutiny to apply to free exercise claims made by prisoners, courts
generally applied some form of heightened scrutiny.43
Any conciliation between the civil rights of incarcerated persons and
the discretion of their jailers ended shortly thereafter as the Court became
deferential to the exercise of executive discretion, applying commensurate
levels of judicial scrutiny. This was because the Court became aware of the
Restorative Justice, CORRECTIONS TODAY 73 (Oct. 2004) (census of Oregon state prisoners
showed that fifty-two percent of them are involved in religious activities).
40. Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952); see also Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81,
83 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that because prisoner was incarcerated in a state prison, the
reasonableness of the refusal to provide religious materials was a subject for the state courts).
41. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1964).
42. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
43. Cf Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding that the burden on
prisoner religious exercise is justified only if the state shows a compelling state interest and no
alternatives that would not infringe upon First Amendment rights) with Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d
1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding where prisoner religious exercise was not presumptively
dangerous, prison officials were required to show "that a particular restriction is necessary to further
an important governmental interest, and that the limitations on freedoms occasioned by the
restriction are no greater than necessary to effectuate the governmental objective involved").
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complexities of prison administration, the expertise required to solve them,
and the separation of powers issue to be avoided.t Hence, in Turner v.
Safley, the Court held that "[w]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."4 5 Then in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the
Court applied this principle, rational basis review,4 6 to an inmate's free
exercise claim, upholding a prison regulation that prevented a group of
Muslim inmates from attending the Jummah, a Friday afternoon
congregational prayer.4 7 In Estate of Shabazz, the inmate-plaintiffs had a
work assignment outside of the prison walls that prevented them from
attending prayer. The prison justified the curtailment of their religious
liberty by citing the length of time it would take to reenter the prison and the
fact that would be excused from completing their full eight-hour workday.48
The Court found that those governmental interests were rationally related to
the government objective and outweighed the burden on the inmates' free
exercise rights.49
The reasonableness of a prison regulation is determined by several
factors outlined in Turner: whether the connection between the regulation
and the government goal is not "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary
or irrational;"50 the existence of alternative means of exercising the
circumscribed right; 1 the impact of accommodating the right on other
inmates, guards, and prison resources generally; 52 and whether there is an
alternative regulation that "fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests." 53 This judicial framework-the
rational basis standard-rendered free exercise claims weak absent invidious
discrimination. Estate of Shabazz foreshadowed the Court's general
movement away from protecting religious exercise incidentally burdened by
state action.54
44. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
45. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
46. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). Broadly
speaking, 'rational basis' is a method of judicial review for determining whether a law is
constitutional by ensuring that it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
47. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
48. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 350-53.
49. Id. at 350-53.
50. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
51. Id. at 90.
52. Id.
53. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 91.
54. See infra Part III(A).
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Shortly thereafter, the Court announced in Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources v. Smith that laws of general applicability that incidentally
burden free exercise of religion are constitutional so long as they are
rationally related to legitimate government interests. 5 Prior to Smith, the
Court mostly applied strict scrutiny to laws that substantially burdened free
56
exercise, meaning the burden on religious exercise would have to satisfy
the "compelling interest test."57  Although Smith was not a case about
prisoners' rights, its effect was that, thereafter, the free exercise claims of
both incarcerated and free people received rational basis review when
alleging government interference with the free exercise of religion. In
general, the decision diminished the protections afforded to religious
adherents in the U.S.
2. RLUIPA Mandates Strict Scrutiny
Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA"). The purpose of RFRA was to "restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder," so that heightened scrutiny would apply to all government acts that
"substantially burdened" religious exercise, even if the burden arose from a
neutral law of general applicability.58 The legislation also specifically
intended to restore strict scrutiny to religious claims made by inmates in light
of the Court's decision in Estate of Shabazz.59 Any fanfare surrounding
RFRA was unwarranted-not only was the law found to be unconstitutional
55. Emp't Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (where
American Indian was withheld a social security entitlement because he had been fired for ingesting
peyote in violation of a law of general applicability that that incidentally burden free exercise, in
this case a prohibition on drugs).
56. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indep. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (applying rational basis).
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (The compelling interest test is a
method of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of a statute or regulation that
restricts the practice of a fundamental right or distinguishes between people due to a suspect
classification. For the statute to be constitutional, there must be a compelling governmental interest
that can be furthered only by the law in question.).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb(b), 2000bb-1.
59. See S. REP. No. 103-111 (1993) (expressing intent to restore "protection afforded to
prisoners to observe their religions[,] which was weakened by the decision in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz").
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as applied to states in City of Boerne v. Flores,60 but also, only ten percent of
religious liberty claims made by inmates were found to be meritorious.6 1
Thereafter, Congress held a series of hearings to correct the
constitutional deficiencies of RFRA identified in City of Boerne. The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") was the
result of this process. City of Boerne prevented Congress from mandating
strict scrutiny under its Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause
powers.62 As a result, RLUIPA was enacted under Congress' Spending and
Commerce Clause powers. Congress identified two "areas of law where the
congressional record of religious discrimination and discretionary burden
was the strongest:" laws governing institutionalized persons (i.e., prisoners
and persons in mental institutions) and land use laws.63 Congress was
motivated to protect the free exercise rights of inmates for several reasons-
the growing concern that those rights were being arbitrarily infringed upont
the strong evidence to suggest that spiritual practice promoted rehabilitation
and reduced recidivism, 65 the observation that federal protection would be
the best vehicle to address the dearth of state legislation protecting religious
liberty,66 and the need to address the barriers imposed by states on prison
60. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (where the Court held that Congress
exceeded its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in defining the substance of
the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
61. Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 607-17 (1998)
(collecting federal and state court prisoner RFRA cases and demonstrating that prisoners lost ninety
out of ninety-nine RFRA claims for which there were reported decisions).
62. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
63. Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning
Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 943-44 (2001).
64. See, e.g., Statements of Sen. Hatch and Kennedy, Statements on Introduced Bills and
Joint Resolutions (July 13, 2000); The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom and
Boerne v. Flores, II: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the
Constitution, 105th Cong. 37-45 (1998) (statement of Isaac M. Jarsoslawicz, Director of Legal
Affairs, Aleph Institute) [hereinafter Testimony of Jarsoslawicz]; The Need for Federal Protection
of Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 105th Congress 54-66 (1998) (statement of Rev. Donald W.
Brooks, Director of Prison Ministry, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa) [hereinafter Testimony of Brooks].
65. See Mark C. Young et al., Long-Term Recidivism Among Federal Inmates Trained as
Volunteer Prison Ministers, 22 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 97, 104, 110-11 (1995) (recidivism rate lower
for prisoners participating in intensive prison ministry as compared to prisoners in the general
population); Melvina T. Sumter, Religiousness and Post-Release Community Adjustment,
GRADUATE RESEARCHFELLOWSHIPEXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (Sept. 25, 2000), http://www.ncjrs.
org/pdffiles 1/nij/grants/1 84509.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Testimony of Jarsoslawicz, supra note 64; Protecting Religious Liberty After
Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Comm. on the Constitution,
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ministry. Even opponents of RLUIPA conceded that religious practice
within prison had net benefits on the administration of prisons.68 Hence,
Congress enacted RLUIPA, mandating that free exercise claims made by
inmates receive strict scrutiny.
The relevant portion of the RLUIPA is reproduced here:
(a) GENERAL RULE- No government 69 shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to
an institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997), even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
(b) SCOPE OF APPLICATION- This section applies in any case in
which-
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, or with Indian tribes.70
105th Cong. 3-11 (1997) (statement of Charles W. Colson, President, Prison Fellowship
Ministries).
67. Testimony of Brooks, supra note 64.
68. See Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary: Issues Relating to Religious
Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure, 106th
Cong. 73, 175 (1999) (statement of Glenn S. Goord, Commissioner New York State Department
of Correctional Services) ("[E]very correction administrator in the country recognizes the vital role
played by most religious practices and beliefs in furthering inmate rehabilitation, in maintaining a
sense of hope and purpose among individual inmates and in enhancing overall institutional safety
and well-being. Most inmates who sincerely practice their religious beliefs do not pose institutional
problems. Rather, as a rule of thumb, they promote institutional stability.").
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4) (RLUIPA defines the term "government" as follows:)
(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority
of a State;
(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in
clause (i); and
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and ... for the purposes of sections
2000cc-2(b) and 2000cc-3 of this title, includes the United States, a branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under
color of Federal law.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (2000).
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II. Using RLUIPA to Challenge Glossip's Known-and-Available
Alternative Requirement
This Note addresses a claim made by a hypothetical inmate who has a
religious objection to capital punishment and who contends that the
substantive pleading requirement in Glossip forces him or her to compromise
their Free Exercise rights. Because of RLUIPA, the known-and-available
alternative requirement is unconstitutional as applied to death row inmates
who have a religious opposition to capital punishment.
A. Pre-RLUIPA Free Exercise Litigation Concerning Capital Punishment
Before the passage of RLUIPA, in Campbell v. Wood the Ninth Circuit
was asked whether a Washington state statute allowing a condemned
prisoner to choose between two methods-of-execution would violate the Free
Exercise Clause.7 1 The statute at issue had a presumption for hanging, but
also allowed the inmate to elect lethal injection.72 In Campbell, the inmate
alleged that his religious beliefs prevented him from making such a choice.73
The court agreed "with Campbell that a statute providing for a choice
between two methods of execution, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, might place an impermissible burden on the free exercise
of the asserted beliefs."74 However, Campbell's claim failed for two reasons.
First, by statute, he was not required to make a choice between methods of
execution. He could remain silent, make no selection, and succumb to the
de facto method. In this sense, he was not forced to make a choice that
would offend his religious beliefs. Second, because the court found that
hanging was not an unconstitutional method-of-execution, the statute did
"not compel Campbell to compromise one constitutional right to avoid the
infringement of another."76 In other words, because there was no apparent
Eighth Amendment violation, Campbell was not forced to express a
preference for a method-of-execution-a choice that would cause him to
71. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West) ("The punishment of death shall be
supervised by the superintendent of the penitentiary and shall be inflicted by intravenous injection
of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until the defendant is
dead, or, at the election of the defendant, by hanging by the neck until the defendant is dead.").
73. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 686.
74. Id. at 687 (citing to Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employ. Security, 489 U.S. 829, 832
(1989)); see also Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 1337 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the claim that a choice
between methods-of-execution was cruel and unusual).
75. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 687.
76. Id.
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compromise his religious beliefs-just in order to ensure that his Eighth
Amendment rights would remain intact.
In contrast, the known-and-available alternative directly implicates a
condemned person's free exercise rights because they are forced to
participate in an activity that challenges a central tenet of their faith as a
condition for exercising their Eighth Amendment right.
B. RLUIPA's Functionality
The level of judicial scrutiny a constitutional claim receives is amongst
the most important factors in determining the constitutionality of
government action. After Glossip, it is arguable that a method-of-execution
claim receives something slightly lower than rational basis review.
Traditional rational basis places a burden on the plaintiff to show that the
rule burdening them is not rationally related to a legitimate government
objective. Glossip creates an additional burden on the plaintiff not just to
satisfy rational basis but also to assist the government in finding a way to
carry out the function sought. That is the essence of the known-and-available
alternative requirement. By advancing the claim under RLUIPA, the
condemned person may side-step compliance with Glossip's onerous
requirement by collaterally attacking it.
RLUIPA requires a prisoner to prove three things: (1) that government
officials have imposed a "substantial burden" on his "religious exercise" (a
merits requirement);7 8 (2) that the "substantial burden" was either (a)
imposed in a program or activity that receives federal funds or (b) affects
interstate commerce (a jurisdictional requirement);7 9 and (3) that all
available administrative remedies have been exhausted, in compliance with
the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").8 0
Once the prisoner has successfully presented a prima facie claim, the
burden shifts to the government to prove that the decision or course of action,
which substantially burdened the prisoner's religious liberty, can withstand
strict scrutiny.81 In other words, the government must prove that the burden
on the religious exercise is the least burdensome way to achieve a compelling
government interest. If the government fails to satisfy strict scrutiny, then
77. Steven Schwinn, Symposium: The Wonderland Rules for Method-of-Execution Claims,
SCOTUS BLOG (June 30, 2015) http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-the-wonderland-
rules-for-method-of-execution-claims/.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(e).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
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RLUIPA specifies that the prisoner is entitled to "any appropriate relief' and
attorney fees.8 2
RLUIPA's jurisdictional requirement can be satisfied by showing that:
(1) the substantial burden [on the prisoner's religious exercise] is imposed in
a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance [Spending
Clause jurisdiction]; or (2) the substantial burden [on the prisoner's religious
exercise] affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian
tribes [Commerce Clause jurisdiction].83
To establish jurisdiction under the Spending Clause hook, the prisoner
must prove that the department of corrections that houses them receives
funding from the federal government. The federal government transfers
millions of dollars to state correctional facilities. 84  Therefore, Spending
Clause jurisdiction does not present significant difficulties. A claimant may
also establish Commerce Clause jurisdiction by showing some
instrumentality related to the execution process, or even to the prison itself,
was transferred in interstate commerce.85
The plaintiff must also demonstrate compliance with the PLRA, which
requires "[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies as required by [the
PLRA], [as] a condition precedent to suit." 86 Courts lack discretion to decide
claims on the merits if this requirement has not been met. In many states,
the department of corrections promulgates lethal injection protocols.
Prisoners have the ability to challenge those protocols through the available
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b).
84. See Alexia Cooper, Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program 2013, DEP'T OF JUST. (Oct.
2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jagpl3.pdf (detailing that the federal government gave
out $278.4 million dollars to state governments from crime related expenditures, including
correctional facilities); see Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (where a state
prisoner established jurisdiction in a state where the department of corrections received
approximately 14.5 million federal dollars in fiscal year 2001, which comprised roughly 1.6% of
their budget, and where the infringement on the inmates free exercise was unrelated to the federal
funding).
85. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (where the Supreme Court
described three categories of activity that fall within Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. First, "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce." Second,
"Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities." Third, "Congress's commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.") (citation omitted).
86. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2002).
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administrative channels open to them.8 7 An inmate seeking redress under
RLUIPA would have to comply with this requirement. It should be noted
that an administrative challenge to the known-and-available alternative
requirement is distinct from most other administrative challenges because
the requirement is not a regulation, but a constitutional provision.
In order to make a prima facie case of a RLUIPA violation, an inmate
must show that there is a 'substantial burden' on their religious exercise. The
first question is: What is a "substantial burden?" The Sherbert Court
articulated the definition of substantial burden as forcing one to "choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the
other."88 Another court put it thus:
a 'substantial burden' must place more than an inconvenience on
religious exercise; a 'substantial burden' is akin to significant pressure
which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her
behavior accordingly. Thus, a substantial burden can result from
pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or
from pressure that mandates religious conduct. 89
'Religious exercise' is defined in RLUIPA. Religious exercise
"includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief." 90 The use of the word 'any' is important as
it displaces the harsh interpretation of the Turner/Estate of Shabazz test,
which would ask whether there were other available means to exercise
religion in lieu of the allegedly burdened form of religious exercise. Hence,
RLUIPA's abandonment of the 'other means available' inquiry expands the
scope and extent of religious liberty within prisons. The question for a court
87. See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, No. CIVA 2:06CV258, 2006 WL 2076717 (E.D. Va. July
21, 2006).
88. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
89. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (The
Midrash court summarized Supreme Court precedent on "substantial burden" in order to give
meaning to Section 2(a) of RLUIPA, which in language almost identical to RLUIPA's prisoner
provisions in Section 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(3)(2004), forbids a government from "impos[ing]
or implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person . . . unless . . . imposition of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
interest."); 42 U.S.C. § 20000cc(a)(1)(2004); see also Coronel v. Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 880
(D. Ariz. 2004) (holding that "state action substantially burdens the exercise of religion within the
meaning of the [prisoner provisions of] RLUIPA when it prevents a religious adherent from
engaging in conduct both important to the adherent and motivated by sincere religious belief").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added.)
Summer 2018] 799
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
is whether the known-and-available alternative requirement is a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of the plaintiff.
C. The Role of Religious Opposition to the Death Penalty
As an initial matter, in order to claim a substantial burden on religious
exercise, the plaintiff hypothesized here must be opposed to capital
punishment on the basis of religion. Yet, it is not a foregone conclusion that
religious belief requires opposition to capital punishment. Opponents and
proponents of the death penalty both cite to religious texts as justification for
their positions. 91 In the Judeo-Christian tradition, religious supporters of
capital punishment rely principally on the Old Testament, which envisions
execution as the punishment for a number of crimes 92 and which endorses
the principle of lex talionis, "an eye for an eye." 93 The New Testament may
also be cited as supporting capital punishment.9 4 Christian theologians such
as Thomas Aquinas are further authority for the proposition that God ordains
capital punishment.95
91. NINA RIVKIND ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 10 (4th ed.
2016).
92. See S. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to the American
Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1042 (1998) (citing Moses
Maimonides) (It has been estimated that there are at least thirty-six capital crimes in the Old
Testament, in addition to murder, including adultery, working on the Sabbath, and being an unruly
child).
93. Leviticus 24:20; Exodus 21:24 ("Whoever takes the life of any human being shall be put
to death.").
94. See generally Romans 13:1-7 ("[4] For the one in authority is God's servant for your
good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are
God's servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. [5] Therefore, it is
necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter
of conscience.").
95. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, INF. DE VITORIA, REFLECTION ON HOMICIDE
& COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEOLOGIAE IP-IPe q. 64, 240-41 (John P. Doyle trans., 1997).
Thomas Aquinas wrote:
Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to the whole.
There if a man is dangerous and infectious to the [others], on account of some sin, it is
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,
since a little leaven corrupted the whole lump.
By sinning everyman departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from
the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself and he
falls into the slavish state of the beasts to be disposed of according as he is useful to
others . . . . Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his
dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast.
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Yet, by and large the Western theological tradition has repudiated the
death penalty. Jesus Christ rejected lex talionis,96 and at one point intervened
to prevent the execution of an adulteress. 97 Today, most major religious
groups in the United States have taken a position against the death penalty.98
Pope Francis expressed that the Catholic Church's opposition to the death
penalty, calling it "inadmissible, no matter how serious the crime
committed." 99  Jewish leaders across denominations expressed similar
opposition. 100 Although there is not a clear line between death penalty
abolition and religious exercise, it is possible to have religiously motivated
opposition to the death penalty.
Whether the religious exercise at issue is central to the believer's faith
or derivative from it is irrelevant. RLUIPA is meant to be "construed in
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise."10 1 Under RLUIPA, "[t]he
term 'religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."1 02 The central
question is whether the belief is sincerely held, "the adherent [must] have an
honest belief that the practice is important to his free exercise of religion." 03
Courts do not inquire into whether a certain expression of faith is required or
mandated by a religion for fear of violating the Establishment Clause for
assessing the validity of a professed belief. 104
96. Matthew 5:38-42 ("You have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth.' But I say to you, Do not resist the one who is evil. But if anyone slaps you on the right
cheek, turn to him the other also. And if anyone would sue you and take your tunic, let him have
your cloak as well. And if anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to the
one who begs from you, and do not refuse the one who would borrow from you.").
97. John 8:4-11.
98. Religion and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 2, 2018)
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php%3Fdid%3D2249.
99. Pope Francis: The Death Penalty Is Inadmissible, NAT'L CATHOLIC REPORTER (1VIar.
20, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/pope-francis-death-penalty-inadmissible.
100. Rabbi Dr. Shmuly Yanklowitz, Jewish Leaders Take A Stand Against the Death Penalty,
JEWISH J. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://jewishjournal.com/culture/arts/182601/jewish-leaders-take-a-
stand-against-the-death-penalty/.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
102. 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
103. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2009), aff'd sub nom.
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
104. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1971) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I)
("And as a general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such,
or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.").
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In any case, free exercise is the right to choose a religious belief and
follow its practices so long as they are otherwise lawful.105 Any suggestion
that a condemned person who claims a religious objection to capital
punishment is misinterpreting scripture should be disregarded. While the
belief must be one that is religious in nature, 106 it does not follow that the
belief must be one that is uniformly adopted by the religion in question for
the belief to be one that merits constitutional protection.1 0 7 Instead, "the
relevant question is not what others regard as an important religious practice,
but what the plaintiff believes."108 Furthermore, the belief does not need to
be one that is compelled by the religion in question. 109 Nonetheless, courts
and prisons conduct an inquiry into the sincerity of the asserted beliefs. 110
Putting that concern aside, the question addressed here is whether adherence
to the known-and-available alternative requirement substantially burdens a
condemned person's free exercise rights, assuming the belief is sincerely held.
D. Glossip's Requirement is a Substantial Burden
The known-and-available alternative requirement is a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a condemned person. This is because by
offering a viable alternative method-of-execution-one that does not pose a
substantial risk of harm to oneself-one becomes a central participant in
helping the state carry out executions. The known-and-available alternative
pleading requirement substantially burdens their free exercise rights for
several reasons.
First, as an initial matter, the mere act of choosing between methods of
execution is constitutionally suspect. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that a
choice between two methods would violate that inmate's free exercise rights
105. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990); but
see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (finding that, where a corporation was
exempted from paying for certain forms of health insurance coverage as they had a religious
objection to the services, this imposed no extra costs on employees because the insurance
companies will provide contraceptive coverage anyways rather than have to pay the cost of an
ensuing pregnancy).
106. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp't Sec'y Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
107. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't ofEmp't Sec'y, 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989).
108. Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (E.D. Cal. 1996); see also Hemandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality
of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of
those creeds.").
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7) (2004) (" [R]eligious exercise' includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by ... a system of religious belief.").
110. Moustafa, supra note 38, at 225-26.
802 [Vol. 45:4
FREE EXERCISE EXCEPTION TO GLOSSIP
because it would impermissibly burden his asserted beliefs by forcing him
to participate in his own execution. 11
Second, forcing a condemned prisoner to suggest an alternative
method-of-execution buoys the system of capital punishment. Not only will
the plaintiff be facilitating one execution, namely their own, but the
alternative method could be used in potentially every other administration of
capital punishment that occurs thereafter. This is so because Glossip requires
the plaintiff to prove that the proposed method-of-execution poses a
substantial risk of harm and set forth the feasibility of an alternative. Hence,
Glossip requires the condemned person to contribute to the success of future
executions. By doing so, Glossip substantially burdens the religious
conscience of the condemned person hypothesized here.
Third, because the requirement puts "substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify [their] behavior to and violate [their] beliefs," it violates
their free exercise rights. 112 The requirement places pressure on the plaintiff
because it is a precondition for litigating the claim in the first place. Hence,
the plaintiff will need to modify their behavior by assisting the government
develop constitutional methods of execution, and in doing so they violate a
tenet of their belief system.
The drafters of RLUIPA foresaw that relief under its impose costs on the
government. 113 The prisoner is both arguing that the government should find
a way to carry out a death sentence that does not violate the Eighth
Amendment and is objecting to the fact that they themselves must fulfill a task
for which the government is ostensibly responsible. This is not a situation in
which a person is exempting himself or herself from a tax burden so that others
may pick up the tab. 114 The cost associated with accommodating the plaintiff s
religious exercise was taken into account by Congress as a necessary
expenditure to assure Constitutional protections are realized.
E. The Means Do Not Justify the Ends
Once claimants have demonstrated that the penal institution has
substantially burdened their religious exercise, the burden shifts to the prison
to show that it is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and is
111. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (citing
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.).
113. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-3 (West 2004) ("*... this chapter may require a government to
incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise").
114. See generally Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Bd. of Edu., 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (holding
that the imposition of sales taxes does not contravene the First Amendment); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the imposition of Social Security taxes is not unconstitutional in
the face of objections based on religious grounds).
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the least restrictive manner of achieving that interest.115 Because of the strict
scrutiny analysis under RLUIPA, in order for the government to satisfy its
burden, it must show that the known-and-available alternative requirement is
the least burdensome way of achieving an important government objective.
A possible government interest in the known-and-available alternative
is the state's interest in the administration of justice-the government has a
"significant interest in meting out a sentence of death in a timely fashion." 1 6
Further, the efficient administration of capital punishment theoretically gives
it the deterrent value that is inherent in any form of punishment.117 There is
an additional government interest in vindicating the life of the victim.118
Lastly, the government has an interest in deterring further litigation aimed at
unnecessarily delaying future executions. The question then becomes: Do
those interests justify the infringement on the inmate's First Amendment
rights, and is the known-and-available alternative requirement the 'least
burdensome' way of achieving the purported aim?
Forcing the inmate to develop a method-of-execution that is
constitutionally tolerable is not the least burdensome way for the government
to achieve the government interest sought. The government could, for
instance, engineer a whole new method-of-execution that does not risk a
significant likelihood of unnecessary pain on the condemned person.
Alternatively, it could hire and train medical staff or even develop drugs
itself for the execution, decreasing the risks of botched executions. It could
also increase transparency and/or rewrite protocols. The burden on the
government to make these changes is not great and, given the magnitude of
the government action at issue, is entirely appropriate.
Without considering the burden on religious exercise in particular, it is
generally difficult for an inmate to formulate a known-and-available
alternative method-of-execution. As an initial matter, the acuity and
emotional stability required to plan one's own execution is overwhelming.
115. Because it is the prisoner's burden to prove a substantial burden on religious exercise,
judgment is appropriate in favor of the defendants where a prisoner fails to produce any competent
evidence (even if it is only declarative testimony explaining why it is that the prison policy burdens
his or her religious exercise) to demonstrate a substantial burden. See Piscitello v. Berge, 2003 WL
23095741, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 17, 2003) (granting summary judgment to prison officials where
plaintiff offered only a "one sentence" argument in his brief that RLUIPA was violated and did not
introduce any evidence to show how the prison's policy had substantially burdened his religious
exercise).
116. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004).
117. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 89-90 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing to the "significant
body of recent evidence that capital punishment may well have a deterrent effect, possibly a quite
powerful one.")
118. Id.; see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006) ("Both the State and the
victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.").
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The burden on a method-of-execution plaintiff is even more exacting when
you consider the perspective from which they have to make the claim.
Prisoners are ill-equipped to determine a constitutional method-of-
execution; even the government uses a fair amount of guesswork in
designing methods of execution. 119 Now, almost all states that have the death
penalty use lethal injection as their method. 120 Assuming that people on
death row have little expertise in the science behind lethal injections,
requiring them to come up with another available method would require
staggering efforts on their part or on the part of their counsel. 121
The secrecy surrounding the procurement of lethal injection drugs and the
methods used increases the difficulty. 122 Given the dearth of available drugs,
the burden placed on inmates is even higher.123 Further, there is the possibility
that plaintiffs find themselves in the same situation as the plaintiff in Arthur-
where the state's only statutorily proscribed method-of-execution was deemed
the only 'available' method-of-execution-making it constructively impossible
for the plaintiff to adhere to the known-and-available alternative requirement. 124
In this light, requiring condemned inmates to plead a known-and-available
alternative is unreasonable and burdensome-not the "least burdensome" way
of achieving the government objective.
The burden on the plaintiff is compounded once the First Amendment
implications are taken into account. Assuming the condemned person has a
religious objection, the requirement compels them to think and act in a
manner that would violate their freedom of conscience. In order to comply
with Glossip, they will necessarily have to express an idea. If that thought
is one which conflicts with their religious conscience, then the requirement
that the inmate think that way, as a precondition to the exercise of their
119. The litigation in Glossip concerned a new lethal injection protocol for which the plaintiffs
would be the test subjects.
120. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 3 (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
121. See Arthur v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1317-18 (11th Cir.
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017), reh'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1838
(2017) (making clear that only other lethal injection protocols would be considered as
"alternative")).
122. See, e.g., Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting
"the veil of secrecy that surrounds Alabama's execution protocol"); Terrell v. Bryson, 807 F.3d
1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., concurring) (discussing Georgia's lethal injection "secrecy
rules").
123. Beth Schwartzapfel, Controlled Substances, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 29, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/06/controlled-substances.
124. Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., (Feb. 2, 2017), https://deathpenalty
info.org/methods-execution (notwithstanding the circumstance in Arthur, nineteen States have only
one statutorily proscribed method of execution).
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Eighth Amendment right, forces them into an uncomfortable choice: either
violate their religious beliefs or forego their right to be executed in a manner
that does not inflict pain and suffering. If it is your belief that capital
punishment is 'inadmissible, no matter how serious the crime committed'
then the known-and-available alternative forces you to acquiesce and be
complicit to a practice that you may find abhorrent based on your religion.
This is especially troubling because at "the heart of the First Amendment lies
the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."1 25 As a
'substantive element' of a method-of-execution claim, Glossip ignores this
First Amendment principle by compelling condemned persons in the
circumstance envisioned here to express an idea that they think is
undeserving of consideration.
There is an argument that the government interest at stake here is
narrower than what was suggested above. Rather, the government interest
in known-and-available alternative requirement is the state's interest in not
bearing the burden of finding a constitutionally tolerable method-of-
execution-even when the existing procedure bears a significant likelihood
of pain. In such a light, the litigant envisioned here will find themselves on
firmer footing as the balance of interests weigh heavily in their favor given
the special place religious exercise in prisons has under RLUIPA.
III. Comments, Counter-Arguments, and Responses
One may contend that this argument erects a straw-man, creating a free
exercise violation where there is none. The condemned person could simply
forgo the challenge and their religious conscience would be unscathed. In
other words, because the government is not preventing the inmate from
exercising their religion, there is not a free exercise problem. The inmate
can still practice their religion while in custody; nothing about Glossip
impedes their ability to do so.
The response to this argument is that the requirement to name an
alternative method-of-execution would therefore exclude religious
opponents of capital punishment from challenging their method-of-
execution. The Court has in other circumstances adopted rules aimed at
preventing situations in which people are forced to choose between two
rights. 126 Here, the choice the hypothesized plaintiff has is either to violate
125. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
126. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610, 618-19 (1976) (holding that the prosecution cannot use a
defendant's post arrest invocation of Miranda rights in order to impeach the defendant, because,
although "Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such
assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be
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their religious principles or to forego their Eighth Amendment rights. This
choice, which the Ninth Circuit saw as constitutionally suspicious, 127
presents a free exercise problem because the government action prevents the
plaintiff from adhering to the precepts of their religion.
Another argument against the plaintiff's claim is that complying with
the known-and-available alternative requirement is not necessarily an
endorsement of capital punishment such that it violates the plaintiff's
religious beliefs. In other words, the religious conscience of the inmate is
undisturbed by the fact that he or she must find another method-of-execution.
However, as noted previously, the plaintiff's alternative would be used not
only in his or her own execution, but it could also be used in any other
subsequent execution. In that sense, one would be propping a system that
institutionalizes a behavior the religious observer finds repugnant. He or she
is providing another means for a practice to which the believer objects. In
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court found that a corporation's religious
principles are substantially burdened by paying into a health insurance
scheme that allows subscribers to choose to seek contraceptive care. 128 In
that case, there was a link between the free exercise rights of the corporation,
which established a health insurance scheme, and the contraceptive care that
their employees elected to have, which was reimbursed by their insurance.
Like in Hobby Lobby, the known-and-available alternative substantially
burdens the free exercise of the plaintiff because it helps further a practice
that the plaintiff's religion forbids. The condemned person becomes
complicit in the administration of capital punishment. In Hobby Lobby, the
Court found a substantial burden on the corporation's religious beliefs when
the health insurance, in their view, was "facilitating abortions."1 29  The
plaintiff imagined here has an analogous burden imposed on them.
A. A Supreme Court Ruling is Subject to RLUIPA
Another counter argument is that RLUIPA only applies to regulations
or practices that are either legislatively enacted or stem from executive
power, and that because the known-and-available alternative requirement
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be
used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial."); see also Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that a prosecutor is not permitted, either expressly or by direct
implication, to comment in the presence of the jury on a defendant's exercise of the right against
self-incrimination).
127. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We agree with Campbell that a
statute providing for a choice between two methods of execution, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, might place an impermissible burden on the free exercise of the asserted beliefs.").
128. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
129. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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stems from a judicial act, RLUIPA does not apply. Furthermore, it could be
argued that RLUIPA only addresses state action, not federal government
actionl30 since RLUIPA applies to government action but defines the word
'government' as "(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental
entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (iii)
any other person acting under color of State law."1 31 That argument is that
the law does not extend to its judgment, because the known-and-available
alternative requirement flows from a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, which is
not enumerated as a 'government' under RLUPA. This argument, however,
does not hold water.
There are several aspects of Glossip's requirement that make the claim
advanced here justiciable under RLUIPA. First, the hypothesized claim
begins with the existence of a state statutory and regulatory scheme that runs
the risk of violating the Eighth Amendment. The condemned prisoner is (in
most cases 1 32) in a state correctional institution, pursuant to a sentence
governed by state law, and the protocols for the execution of that sentence
promulgated by a state agency. A method-of-execution claim is not an attack
on Glossip per se, rather, it is an allegation that the statutorily proscribed
method-of-execution violates the Eighth Amendment. As was explained
above, Glossip has two parts. The first is that the plaintiff must show that
due to the state statutory scheme, there is a substantial likelihood of harm.
Glossip's second requirement is the known-and-available alternative
requirement. Adherence to these elements of an Eighth Amendment claim
is intimately linked to both the lethal injection protocols promulgated by the
state correctional authority and the state legislation providing for methods-
of-execution. 133 The state, as opposed to the Supreme Court, becomes the
relevant locus of government action in instances where the death penalty
statutes only envision one method-of-execution. In those circumstances,
courts have held that there are no other known-and-available alternatives
because the statutory scheme only allows for one-in essence foreclosing
the ability to have the method-of-execution claim heard. 134 In this light, even
130. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).
132. See, e.g., Death Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., (July 1, 2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (showing that there
are 2756 condemned prisoners in state prisons and 61 in federal prison).
133. In most states that have the death penalty, the legislature proscribes the method-of-
execution in general terms. The legislature then delegates authority to the correctional agency,
which enacts rules governing the minutiae of the execution.
134. Arthur v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1301 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied sub nom. Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725 (2017), reh'g denied, 137 S. Ct. 1838 (2017).
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taking a narrow understanding of the word 'government,' the claim deals
centrally with the actions of the state government. Hence, this claim is
justiciable under RLUIPA's definition of 'government.'
Alternatively, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act ("RFRA")
applies to federal action. If adherence to Glossip is strictly a federal matter,
then the prisoner could take advantage of the nearly identical statutory
scheme under RFRA. 135  The statute covers both state and federal
prisoners.136 RFRA applies to every branch of the federal government.137
Glossip is a case from the U.S. Supreme Court, part of the judicial branch of
the federal government. Therefore, state prisoner on death row could take
advantage of the RFRA to make the claim envisioned here if a court were to
hold that a challenge to Glossip is nonjusticiable under RLUIPA.
B. Hybrid Rights as an Alternative Theory
If a court rejects the argument that RLUIPA applies to the claim
proposed here, then the claim would be subject to rational basis analysis
under Smith. 138  This is so because the known-and-available alternative
requirement is a law of general application, that in this instance incidentally
burdens free exercise. In Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that strict
scrutiny was applied previously only in situations where the Free Exercise
Clause was implicated along with other constitutional protections. 139
Thereafter, the only instances in which free exercise claims are afforded
heightened scrutiny are for laws that are not neutral or generally applicable,
which involve a system of individualized exemptions or assessments, or
which run afoul of "hybrid rights." Otherwise, the claim receives rational
basis scrutiny.
The concept of hybrid rights is another avenue through which the
plaintiff imagined here could challenge the known-and-available alternative
as violating the Free Exercise Clause. What makes the hybrid rights theory
difficult for the plaintiff imagined here, is that the hybrid right hypothesized
has never been recognized.
135. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000bb-1.
136. Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1995) (RFRA claim made by a state prisoner);
Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir.1994); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th
Cir.1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1166 (these holdings are based on the fact that Congress debated
and rejected an amendment that would have excluded prisons from the RFRA); see also S. REP.
No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ V(d) and XI (1993); H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1993 pp. 1892, 1898, 1906.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2.
138. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
139. Id. at 881 (Yoder involved the right to educate your children as you see fit. Sherbert,
Hobbie, and Thomas dealt with unemployment insurance, so formed a class apart).
Summer 2018] 809
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Glossip arguably generates a hybrid right by implicating both the First
and Eighth Amendments by creating a zero-sum choice for the condemned
plaintiff imagined here. Justice Scalia, in Smith, outlined the hybrid rights
doctrine as follows: "[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections."1 40 Justice Scalia noted five constitutional rights that could
combine with a free exercise claim in order to form a hybrid claim: freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, the right of parents to direct the education
of their children, freedom from compelled expression, and freedom of
association. 141
Lower courts have used three approaches towards deciding whether
there are other, unenumerated hybrid rights. 142 The first approach, adopted
by the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits ignores the doctrine altogether and
treats Justice Scalia's language in Smith regarding hybrid rights as dicta. 143
This is so because it would be too easy to construe a claim as implicating
more than one right, and hence, the doctrine of hybrid rights would in effect
swallow the rule set forth in Smith. 144 The First and the D.C. Circuits use the
independent-claims approach. 145 Under this approach, a hybrid rights claim
is valid only in circumstances where the companion claim can win on its own
without a free exercise claim. The problem with this approach is that it takes
the teeth out of the theory of hybrid rights: If the additional constitutional
challenge must independently win to invoke a hybrid rights claim, then there
is no need for a hybrid rights analysis in the first place. 146 The Ninth and
140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
141. Id. at 882.
142. Ryan S. Rummage, In Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious Liberty,
64 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1189 (2015).
143. Id. at 1190; Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2001)
(concluding that Smith's "language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this
court."); Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that "[u]ntil
the Supreme Court provides direction, we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta."); Kissinger
v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (calling the hybrid rights
theory "completely illogical").
144. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that the hybrid rights language of Smith is purely dicta, and ultimately
"untenable").
145. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (where the court
rejected a hybrid rights claim because the free exercise claim was "not conjoined with an
independently protected constitutional protection"); Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (applied in Mahoney v. Dist. of Columbia, 662 F. Supp. 2d 74, 95 n. 12 (D.D.C. 2009).
146. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring); see also, The
Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Right Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1494, 1502
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Tenth Circuits use a third "colorable claims" approach. 147 It holds that a
valid hybrid rights claim is one which includes a free exercise claim
accompanied by another claim that has a probable, or colorable, chance of
success on its own. 148 Hybrid rights claims usually are "only seeking an
exemption from the law, not a finding that the law is unconstitutional." 4 9
That is, in essence, what the challenger envisioned in this note is seeking.
There have been several instances in which lower courts have recognized
new hybrid rights.15 0
A condemned person has two rights that are implicated by the ruling in
Glossip. First, they have an Eighth Amendment right to a method-of-
execution that will not cause severe pain or a significant likelihood of it. 151
Second, even as prisoners, they have a Free Exercise right to practice their
religion. Glossip implicates both of these rights because it is the vehicle
through which the method-of-execution claim must be litigated and because
the known-and-available alternative requirement forces the litigant to
(2010) (describing this approach as the "weakest attempt" to give meaning to the hybrid rights
language in Smith).
147. Rummage, supra note 142, at 1195.
148. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception ", 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573,
600 (2003) ("The colorable claim standard, properly applied, appears to most closely approximate
the design of Smith."); Timothy J. Santoli, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith:
Examining How Courts Are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 670 (2001) ("Thus, the 'colorable
claim' theory to the hybrid-rights exception is best suited to weigh the companion claim."); John
L. Tuttle, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights
Claims Under Employment Division v. Smith, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 741, 742 (2005) ("This article
contends the colorable showing approach to the hybrid rights exception of Smith is the most
appropriate approach adopted by the lower courts.").
149. Rummage, supra note 142, at 1206.
150. See, e.g., Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (where the court found the plaintiffs had successfully alleged a
hybrid free exercise and free speech claim in relation to a school's mandatory hair dressing policy);
Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (where the court applied strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights doctrine to a claim made
by a church against a city's zoning ordinance that prevented the use of the property for worship or
prayer, claiming that the law violated its rights to free exercise and free speech); Hicks ex rel. Hicks
v. Halifax Cty. Bd. of Edu., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (where the court used the hybrid
rights framework, combining free exercise rights and the right of parents' to direct the upbringing
of their children, to apply heightened scrutiny to a student's legal guardian and great-grandmother
challenging a school board's mandatory uniform policy on religious grounds).
151. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50-51 (2008) (requiring a substantial risk of harm and a
viable alternative for an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Evans v. Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d
519, 524 (D. Md. 2006) (asking "whether an inmate facing execution has shown that he is subject
to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Cooey v. Taft, 430 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
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compromise their religious beliefs. By showing that both these rights are
implicated, the litigant has presented a hybrid right.
Once a plaintiff presents a hybrid rights claim, the court guides their
strict scrutiny analysis through three questions. 152 First, is the claimant being
compelled to act?1 53 Second, would granting an exemption injure others?
Third, would granting an exemption violate the Establishment Clause? Here,
the claimant is being compelled to act because the requirement is a
'substantive element' of the method-of-execution claim. An exemption
would cause no injury to others because the cost associated with finding
another method-of-execution would not be transferred to other people.
Further, creating an exemption does not create an Establishment Clause
issue; the government maintains the position that is antithetical to the
religious viewpoint for which one is seeking an exemption. Lastly, within
the hybrid rights framework, the dominant question is not whether an
exemption establishes a religion; rather, the question is whether the burden
imposed by the government is the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental purpose. As argued above, that is not the case in
this circumstance.
C. How to Approach the Judicial Remedy
If a court were to hold that the known-and-available alternative violates
the plaintiffs free exercise rights, that court would need to create a remedy.
In other words, if a court were to find a particular method-of-execution to be
unconstitutional and then excuse the inmate from complying with the known-
and-available alternative requirement even though it was the only currently
available means to carry out an otherwise lawful sentence, the court would in
effect create a permanent stay on the execution for that person. Yet, the
Court's decisions in this area have been animated in part by the recognition
that because capital punishment is constitutional, "[i]t necessarily follows that
there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out."1 54
For further guidance on judicial remedies in method-of-execution
claims, we may look at the manner in which lower courts addressed the issue
152. Rummage, supra note 142, at 1212.
153. Rummage, supra note 142, at 1213 ("The vast majority of successful pre-Smith free
exercise claimants dealt with this exact issue: the law forced the claimant to act in violation of
religious beliefs. In West Virginia State Board ofEd. v. Barnette, the claimant's child was required
to salute the flag in violation of the family's religion. In Sherbert v. Verner, the claimant was
required to work on Saturday in violation of her religious beliefs. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
claimant's child was required to attend school past the eighth grade in violation of the family's
sincere religious beliefs. In each of these three cases, the government compelled the claimant to
act against religious beliefs, and the government lost each time.").
154. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732-33 (2018) (citing to Baze, 553 U.S. at 47.).
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before Glossip. In Morales v. Hickman, the court decided that uncertainty
coupled with the risk that California's lethal injection protocol carried an
undue risk of pain, merited an equitable remedy. 155 Judge Jeremy Fogel
sought to find a remedy that would "place a substantially lesser burden on
the State's strong interest in proceeding" with the execution, eventually
suggesting that medical professionals ought to be present for the lethal
injection procedure to be constitutional. 156 Other jurisdictions have devised
similar remedies. 157  Judge Fogel later commented that the challenge
presented an opportunity for leadership on the part of the executive branch
to the extent that it was up to that branch of government to find a
constitutional method-of-execution.158
Any court, in addressing this issue, is confronted by the judicial lack of
expertise in methods-of-execution, the risk of overstepping the boundaries
of their branch of government, and becoming embroiled in the matters of
state government. 159 By establishing a remedy, a court runs the risk of
exercising either an executive or legislative function. The decision in Baze
(the case underlying Glossip) was influenced by Bell v. Wolfish, where the
Court reversed a structural injunction in a prison conditions case, reiterating
the principle that there is a "wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet
constitutional and statutory requirements [which] are confided to officials
outside the Judicial Branch of Government."1 60 Furthermore, courts are
particularly reluctant to become embroiled in "ongoing scientific
controversies beyond their expertise."1 61 However, the question presented
by this Note is narrow and litigants ought to focus the court's decision
making on the discrete matter before them-whether the known-and-
available alternative withstands a challenge under RLUIPA.
The condemned person envisioned is asking for two things: first, in
light of their arguments, that the court hold that a particular method-of-
execution is unconstitutional; and second, that they be exempted from
complying with the known-and-available alternative requirement. This
155. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2006) [hereinafter Morales 1l].
156. Morales II, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (here, the medical professionals that were supposed
to be present for the execution balked when they learned of the nature of the task they were asked
to do, giving rise to Morales II).
157. See Brown v. Beck, No. 06-3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006)
(permitting execution to proceed "on the condition that there are present and accessible to Plaintiff
throughout the execution personnel with sufficient medical training to ensure Plaintiff is in all
respects unconscious prior to and at the time of the administration" of the lethal drugs).
158. Morales II, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (discussing Morales I).
159. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008).
160. Id. at 51 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).
161. Id.
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would essentially put the court back into the position that it was trying to
avoid when it forced the plaintiff to answer the method-of-execution
question. But even if that analysis is correct, if this claim were to win, it
would merely shift the burden of finding a constitutional method-of-
execution back onto the party who bears the burden of carrying it out. Strict
scrutiny analysis is meant to achieve just that.
Conclusion
By first outlining the interplay of judicial scrutiny and the free exercise
clause, then explaining the mechanics of RLUIPA and addressing several
counter-arguments, this Note argued that Glossip's known-and-available
alternative requirement violates the free exercise rights of a condemned
inmate who has a religious opposition to the death penalty. This conclusion
is valuable for several reasons.
First, by recognizing the importance of religious practice even for a
condemned person, holding that the known-and-available alternative
requirement is unconstitutional recognizes the dignity of that person and
allows the death sentence to go forward without compromising the
government's legitimacy and need to comply with constitutional mandates.
Second, this holding would reaffirm the First Amendment principle that
nobody should be compelled by the government to act in a manner that is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Third, considering capital punishment is
the most serious governmental action on a citizen, this finding shifts the
responsibility of executing people in a manner that is consistent with the
Eighth Amendment back onto the government. And lastly, in light of Arthur,
this free-exercise exception to Glossip may be the only manner in which a
method-of-execution claim could be addressed on the merits.
814 [Vol. 45:4
